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now well-settled distinction between duties of care and .protection 19
emanating from an employer-employee relationship and the usual
duties of care flowing between individuals not so related. 20
B. B. L.
UNIFORm TRUST RECEIPT ACT-SECURITY INTEREST-LIERTY
OF SALE-BUYER IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF BusINESS.-On
March 5, 1940, Carl Florio borrowed $2,500 from plaintiff, giving
therefor his promissory note, secured by a trust receipt. By the
terms of the receipt, Florio agreed to hold two trucks just received
from the manufacturer in trust for the plaintiff. Florio was to have
the privilege of exhibiting the trucks and could sell them only with
the written consent of the plaintiff. If they were sold, he was to hold
the proceeds of the sale for the plaintiff. Three days later, Florio
sold the trucks to Louis Neveloff, who was unaware of the existence
of the trust receipt, pursuant to a conditional sales contract which
provided that title should remain in the seller, named as Carl Florio
in the conditional sales agreement, until the agreed price was paid,
and that the seller could repossess the trucks upon default in pay-
ments, or if they were attached by creditors. Within the next two
weeks, the conditional sales contract was assigned for new value to
the plaintiff, and duly filed. The purchaser defaulted in making pay-
ments under the conditional sales contract, but before plaintiff could
repossess the trucks, they were attached by defendants, who are a
deputy sheriff and creditors of the conditional vendee. This action is
brought to replevin the trucks, and is resisted on the ground that the
conditional sales contract is invalid as against the defendants because
it failed to comply with a statute requiring all the conditions of a
conditional sales agreement to be incorporated in the filed contract.'
It is claimed that the filed contract is defective in that it failed to men-
tion the trust receipt transaction, and falsely described Florio as the
seller and holder of title, whereas in truth he had no authority to sell,
and title was in the entruster, by virtue of the trust receipt. Held,
the conditional sales contract was validly filed as against defendants;
failure to mention the trust receipt was not material and its descrip-
tion of the vendor as the seller and holder of title was accurate, since
1 9 See Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in New York Cent. R. R. v. Win-field, 244 U. S. 147, 165 (1917).
2 0 See Schoene and Watson, Workmen's Compensation on Interstate Rail-
ways (1934) 47 HARv. L. REv. 389; Richbeig, Advantages of a Federal Com-
pensation Act for Railway Employees (1931) 21 Am. LA.. LEG. Rev. 401.
1 CoNN. GEN. STATUTES OF 1930, § 4697 in substance requires that a condi-
tional bill of sale must be recorded to protect the vendor against innocent pur-
chasers from the conditional vendee, and further provides that it must set forth
"all conditions of such sale."
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RECENT DECISIONS
the entruster acquired merely a lien, and Florlo had both title and
liberty of sale. Under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, the entruster
need not get title as security, but may obtain a lien instead. Premium
Commercial Corporation v. Kaspraycki et a., 129 Conn. 446, 29 A.
(2d) 610 (1942).
At common law, a trust receipt transaction was necessarily a
three-party affair,2 in which the borrower never obtained title, but
the title always 3 was conveyed directly from the original owner to
the lender as security.4 Attempts to execute trust receipts to a lender
by a borrower who had title were generally construed as creating
chattel mortgages,5 and thus had to be filed,6 although true common
law trust receipts required no filing.7 The Uniform Trust Receipts
Act,8 adopted by New York in 1934,9 and by Connecticut in 1934,10
broadened the trust receipt concept so as to permit the borrower-
titleholder to execute the receipt."1 It also provided that the security
interest need not be title, but might alternatively be derived by way
of pledge or otherwise.'2 Filing or taking possession is now required
in order to protect the entruster.' s The purpose of the Connecticut
statute requiring all conditions of a conditional sales contract as filed
to be set forth therein is to inform the person doing business with the
conditional vendee just what interest the latter has. 4 Here the in-
terest of the conditional vendee was unaffected by the existence of
the trust receipt, since the vendee was unaware of its execution. The
conditional vendee as a buyer in the ordinary course of business took
free and clear of the entruster's interest,'5 and the trust receipt trans-
2 (1922) 22 COL. L. Rnv. 546, 560: "The only situation in which trust
receipts can be properly used is one in which the title of property by way of
security is conveyed to the creditor by the owner, who is not the person respon-
sible for the satisfaction of the obligation which the property secures"; In re
Cullen, 282 Fed. 902 (1922).
8 See Hamilton Nat. Bank v. McCallum, 58 F. (2d) 912, 913 (1932).
'WHTEY, LAW OF SALES (2d ed. 1941); Arena v. Bank of Italy, 194
Cal. 195, 228 Pac. 441 (1924).5 McLeon Nash-Motors v. Commercial Credit Trust, 187 Minn. 462, 246
N. W. 17 (1932) ; In re Fountain, 282 Fed. 816 (1922).
SCf. N. Y. LIEN LAW § 230.7 1n re James, 30 V. (2d) 555 (1929).
8 This Act has been adopted by thirteen states at the present writing.
These are California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and
Tennessee.
9 New York was the first state to adopt this Act. L. 1934, c. 574, N. Y.
PERs. PROP. LAW §§ 50-58L, in effect July 1, 1934.10 Conn. L. 1937, c. 230a; CONN. GEN. STATUTES Supp. (1939) § 1274-e.
11 UNFoR TRUST REncmr s Ac § 2, subd. 1; N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW
§ 52, subd. 1.
2 UNIrFOlm TRUST RECEIPTs Acr § 2; N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 52.
'
3 UmFoRu TRuST REcPTs Acr §§ 7, 8, 9; N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW §§ 57,
58, 58e; Mason v. Wylde,308 Mass. 268, 32 N. E. (2d) 615 (1941).
24 See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Carlson, 114 Conn. 514, 516, 159 AtI. 352,
353 (1932).
25 UNIFORm TRUST REcEn'Ts Ace § 9, subd. 2(c) ; N. Y. Puns. PROP. LAW
1943 ]
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action therefore in no way modified the conditional sales contract,
insofar as Neveloff was concerned, and could not affect the rights of
anyone who acquired an interest through him. The trustee having
the right to exhibit the trucks, any sale he made was valid as against
the entruster, despite any limitation on his authority which was un-
known to the vendee; 16 hence Florio was truly the "seller", as he
described himself in the conditional sales agreement. Moreover,
Florio retained title to the trucks when he executed the trust receipt;
in an appropriate case, under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, the
entruster obtains merely a lien as his security interest, and not title.17
The conditional sales contract as filed was therefore the true contract
entered into by the parties, and not incomplete or false. A trust
receipt transaction under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, while
characteristically different in legal effect than it was at common law,
must yet be classified in a separate category among the security forms
which we recognize today.1 8 Thus it is still regarded as being distinct
from chattel mortgage arrangements. 9  Whether title, pledge, or
other lien constitutes the security interest must be judged in each case
in accordance with the intent of the parties.
H.L.
§ 58-a, subd. 2A (ii) ; Bank of America Nat Trust and Savings Ass'n v. Na-
tional Funding Corp., 45 Cal. App. (2d) 320, 114 P. (2d) 49 (1941).
6 UNrFoRm TRUST R icEU'rs AcT § 9, subd. 2(c) ; N. Y. PERs. PRor. LAw
§58a, subd. 2(c).
17 California courts have gone so far as to state that title is never conveyed
as security, but that the security interest is always a lien. See Bank of America
Nat. Trust and Savings Ass'n v. National Funding Corp., 45 Cal. App. (2)
323, 114 P. (2d) 52 (1941), cited supra note 15.
28 Chichester v. Commercial Credit Co., 37 Cal. App. (2d) 439, 99 P. (2d)
1083 (1940).
29 Commercial Discount Co. v. Los Angeles County et at., 16 Cal. (2d)
158, 105 P. (2d) 115 (1940).
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